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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1959
eral Assembly has in effect, made the 'equity' cases and the law es-
tablished therein applicable to situations such as that before us."9
The court further found that the defendant's evidence in support of
laches was the passage of the long period of time and held that such
was not enough. No material prejudice was shown and the court re-
fused to infer prejudice from the mere lapse of time. "In order to
successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the person asserting the claim
must show that he has been materially prejudiced by the delay of the
adverse party in asserting his rights."' 0 It was stated that the de-
fendant had established nothing more than "mere inconvenience."
Frantz v. Maher" held that the rule against enforceability of an
oral contract to make a will, which was based upon the Statute of
Frauds, had no application to a contract in which the promise was
not to make a will, but to allow property to descend to the plaintiff
by intestate distribution.
In Adam v. Southwood,12 an action was brought for recission of a
contract for the purchase of a house and a lot on the ground of mis-
representation. The owner of the lot adjacent to that of the vendor
had previously filed suit against the vendor to require removal of a
fence which, it was alleged, interfered with the neighbor's use of a
joint driveway. This suit, pending at the time the contract of sale
was entered into, was subsequently settled in the vendor's favor. At
the time of the negotiations for the sale, in answer to direct question-
ing by the vendee, the vendor stated that all matters relating to the
fence had been settled. The court held that the recission should be
granted because of this misrepresentation.
EDGAR I. ING
EVIDENCE
INFERENCE ON AN INFERENCE
On a Sunday morning in 1918, a boy was injured by a moving
motor truck. Suit for his injuries was brought against the owner of
the truck who was alleged by plaintiff to be responsible. It became
necessary to prove (1) that the defendant did in fact own the truck
which caused the harm, and (2) that at the time in question it was
being driven by an employee of the defendant in the scope of his em-
9. Smith v. Smith, 168 Ohio St. 447, 456, 156 N.E.2d 113, 120 (1959). See also discussion
in Domestic Relations section, p. 375 supra.
10. Id. at 455, 156 N.E. 2d at 119.
11. 106 Ohio App. 465, 155 N..2d 471 (1957). See also discussion Wills and Decedents'
Estates section, p. 453 infra.
12. 107 Ohio App. 425, 159 N.E.2d 781 (1958).
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ployment. One witness testified that he saw the words "The Lubric"
inscribed on the truck. There was no other evidence of ownership,
and much less that whoever was responsible for the truck's operation
was an employee of the defendant.
The supreme court held that while evidence of the inscription on
the truck would support an inference that defendant owned the truck,
it would not support the further inference that it was being driven by
an employee of the defendant on defendant's business when the in-
jury occurred.i As is set forth in the syllabus of the case, "an infer-
ence of fact cannot be predicated upon another inference, but must be
predicated upon a fact supported by evidence." '
This rule is stated over and over again by courts without further
analysis' and without a realization on their part that, as Wigmore
says:
There is no such orthodox rule; nor can be. If there were, hardly a single
trial could be adequately prosecuted.4
Some courts, probably secretly troubled by the lack of basis for
this all-embracing rule, have occasionally attempted to distinguish
and escape its irrational stringency by allowing several "parallel" in-
ferences to be drawn from the same fact which has been established
by the evidence, or, to put it differently:
... [A] given state of facts proven to the satisfaction of the jury may
give rise to two or more separate inferences, and in such a case one
inference is not built upon the other, each is drawn independently from
the same evidence. 5
In McDougall v. Glenn Cartage Company,6 the supreme court
had before it a fact situation similar to that in Sobolovitz v. Lubric
Oil Company. The negligence and injury were clearly shown; there
was evidence of ownership by the defendant, perhaps a bit stronger
than in Sobolovitz, though no argument appears to have been made
on this point. Scope of employment was about as much a matter of
inference as it was in Sobolovitz. In the trial court, defendant's mo-
1. Sobolovitz v. Lubric Oil Co., 107 Ohio St. 204, 140 N.E. 634 (1923).
2. Id. at syllabus 2.
3. In the period covered by this Survey, it is found in Dungan v. Hart, 107 Ohio App. 431,
159 N.E.2d 903 (1958). Of course, one can hardly blame a court of appeals for following
a well-established precedent. For a discussion of the Dungan case, see Torts section, p. 434
infra.
4. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 41 (3d ed. 1940). Strangely, in his list of horrible examples,
he cites St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Brodbeck, 114 Ohio St. 423, 151 N.E. 323 (1926), and does
not mention Sobolovitz v. Lubric Oil Co.
5. Gero v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 Vt. 462, 480, 18 A.2d 154, 163 (1941);
see also Hurt v. Charles J. Rogers Transp. Co., 164 Ohio St. 329, 130 N.E.2d 820 (1955);
Hozian v. Crucible Steel Casting Co., 132 Ohio St. 453, 9 N.E.2d 143 (1937).
6. 169 Ohio St. 522, 160 N.E.2d 266 (1959). See also discussion in Conflict of Laws sec-
tion, p. 355 supra.
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tion for a directed verdict was sustained at the dose of plaintiff's
case on the authority of Sobolovitz.
The supreme court reversed and remanded, overruling Sobolo-
vitz "so far as it conflicts with this opinion." The supreme court
appears to have put great stress upon the fact that the offending ve-
hicle "bore defendant's name and distinctive markings with ICC and
PUCO permits and numbers. ' 8
It is hard for this writer to tell whether the basis for the court's
decision is that of parallel inferences drawn from the same estab-
lished fact or whether the decision terminated the earlier rule that an
inference of fact cannot be predicated upon an inference. Although
the decision in McDougall appears to be correct, still, there is a valid
basis for what Wigmore calls "an underlying distrust of inferences
which rest upon too many intervening inferences."" (Emphasis
added.)
Undoubtedly, this most recent decision will lead to others of a
similar nature in varying situations, and the new rule will slowly take
definite shape before our eyes.
PRESUMPTIONS
In another case' 0 decided during the period covered by this Survey,
the Court of Appeals for Lucas County applied to a criminal case
the rule, heretofore found in numerous civil cases," that a presump-
tion is a procedural device which is resorted to only in the absence of
evidence by the party in whose favor a presumption would otherwise
operate. Where a litigant produces evidence tending to prove a fact,
either directly or by inference, which for procedural purposes would
be presumed in the absence of such evidence, the presumption never
arises, and the case must be submitted to the jury without any refer-
ence to the presumption in either a general or a special charge. In
the face of evidence on the matter, a charge on the presumption
7. Id. at syllabus 3.
8. Id. at 528, 160 N.E.2d at 270. If this were so, it hardly seems that it was necessary to
indulge in any inference of ownership, which was what seems to have troubled the court in
Sobolovitz. In other words, ownership being dear, only the one inference of scope of employ-
ment was necessary.
9. 1 WIGMOR, op. cit. supra note 4, § 41. Wigmore quotes from New York Life Ins. Co.
v. McNeely, 52 Ariz. 187, 195, 79 P.2d 948, 955 (1938), in which the following significant
test is used. "... [The courts do not mean that under no circumstances may an inference be
drawn from an inference, but rather that the prior inferences must be established to the ex-
clusion of any other reasonable theory rather than merely by a probability, in order that the
last inference in the probability of the ultimate fact may be based thereon." For a case in
which, without adverting to the Sobolovitz rule, the court refused to go from one inference to
another on the basis of unreasonableness, see Nanashe v. Lemmon, 162 N.E.2d 569 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1958).
10. City of Toledo v. Gfell, 107 Ohio App. 93, 156 N.E.2d 752 (1958).
11. Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 NX.2d 401 (1957); Carson v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 165 Ohio St. 238, 135 N.E.2d 259 (1956); Shepherd v. Midland Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 152 Ohio St. 6, 87 N.E.2d 156 (1949).
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would indicate to the trier of the facts that the presumption has some
evidentiary weight.12
The city ordinance under which defendant-appellant was convicted
of driving while under the influence of alcohol contained explicit pre-
sumptions as to the degree of influence or non-influence, depending
upon the chemical analysis of the defendant's bodily substance tested.
However, there were in evidence some "objective symptoms" from
which an inference could be drawn that the defendant at the time and
place was under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the court of
appeals held that to charge the jury on the presumptions of the ordi-
nance was prejudicial error.
PREJUDICIAL COMMENT BY COUNSEL
Two cases decided during the period covered by this Survey were
reversed as a result of prejudicial remarks by counsel during trial.
In Sellers v. Commins,'3 the following occurred during the voir dire:
Mr. Sieman [plaintiff's counsel]: Are there any members of this
panel that are employed by an insurance company selling liability insur-
ance on motor vehicles? (no answer) Are there any members of the
panel that own stock or any of you that have any financial interest in
any insurance company selling liability insurance on automobiles? (no
answer) (Conference at bench by Mr. Day [defendant's counsel] and
court)
Mr. Sieman: Did he want to make that openly to the jury?
Mr. Day: I object to that question in the hearing of the jury.
Mr. Sieman: If Mr. Day has an objection let him make his objection
out loud in the hearing of the jury.
Mr. Day: (at bench) I move to discharge the panel by reason of the
last two questions, and by reason of his twice repeating the statement
"Do you want to make that objection to the jury" and I move to with-
draw a juror and discharge the entire panel.
Mr. Sieman: Counsel for plaintiff denies having made the statement
twice and/or that counsel for plaintiff asked Mr. Day when he went to
the judge to make the objection whether or not he cared to make that
objection openly .... 1 (Emphasis the court's.)
Of this the supreme court said:
In our opinion, the trial court should have forthwith granted defend-
ant's motion to withdraw a juror and discharge the panel. We can see
no possible justification for this apparent effort by the plaintiff's counsel,
at the outset of a trial, to discredit opposing counsel by suggesting that
he was trying to hide something from the jury. If plaintiff's counsel
had really wanted to hear what opposing counsel had to say to the court,
he could readily have availed himself of that opportunity in a dignified
and orderly manner by joining him at the bench. We cannot understand
the argument in plaintiff's brief that "there was no misconduct ...
12. This view, although supported by Wigmore, is not universally held. See McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 314-16 (1954).
13. 169 Ohio St. 332, 159 N.E.2d 600 (1959).
14. Id. at 333, 159 N.E.2d at 601.
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since plaintiff's counsel is entitled to know what defendant's counsel is
attempting to read into the record." Plaintiff's counsel could have easily
found that out from the reporter without trying to discredit his op-
ponent with the jury.
In his brief, plaintiff's counsel states that "as evidence of plaintiff's
counsel's good faith, he denied immediately in the presence of counsel
for the defendant, out of the hearing of the jury, that he had made any
such statements." We cannot comprehend how denials, which the fore-
going-quoted parts of the record (which we must assume to be accurate)
apparently indicate as false denials, would be any evidence at all of good
faith. 5
In Shapiro v. Kilgore Cleaning and Storage Company,'" plaintiff,
an attorney, sued defendant for injuries sustained in a head-on colli-
sion with defendant's truck. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff
appealed. The testimony was almost irreconcilably conflicting, prin-
cipally over whether plaintiff's automobile was on the wrong side of
the road at the time of the impact. The only witnesses were plaintiff
and defendant's driver. Their credibility was therefore of vital im-
portance.
Counsel for defendant made his argument to the jury on the
facts and then proceeded to the issue of credibility in the following
unfortunate manner:
I am troubled by something in this case that goes far deeper, and
with this I am through. I think the facts are perfectly dear that under
these pictures Mr. Shapiro's story can't be accurate. I don't accuse him
of being deliberately misleading. I think he is mistaken. But as you
well know, in the eyes of the public, lawyers do not have the most
savory reputation. This goes for me, for Mr. Gaines (Gaines was
counsel for the plaintiff), and for all of us. The word "shyster" has a
meaning in our language. If a person says that word you know what
he is talking about. Now, ladies and gentlemen, I have nothing
against a lawyer coming into court and demanding redress for an injury,
but when he is so obviously wrong I confess it makes me sick. Every
time a lawyer goes sour in the public prints, every time it happens it
is a little harder for my wife to go into the grocery store and do her
shopping. They tar us all with the same brush. Please, please, don't
tar me with this one. ... 17
The court of appeals found this to be prejudicial error, not cured
by the efforts of the trial court to correct this in its general charge.
With both decisions the writer of this article could not more heartily
concur.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF TESTS FOR ALCOHOLIC INFLUENCE
In Parton v. Wfleilnau,"' the supreme court stated that "the scien-
tific foundation for [the blood alcohol] test for sobriety is not so well
15. Id. at 334, 159 N.E.2d at 601.
16. 156 N.E.2d 866 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
17. Id. at 868.
18. 169 Ohio St. 145, 158 N.E.2d 719 (1959). The court invited comparison to City of
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established and known that a court can take judicial notice as to its
significance," and that, "therefore, a jury without the guidance of ex-
pert testimony, should not be permitted to speculate as to its signifi-
cance. '" (Emphasis added.)
USE OF TESTIMONY GIVEN AT A FORMER TRIAL
Ohio Revised Code section 2945.49 is a statutory regulation of
the use of testimony taken at an examination or a preliminary hear-
ing, or by deposition, or at a former trial. In substance, it provides
for the use of such testimony by either the state or the defendant for
several causes, one of which is ". . . whenever the witness . . . cannot
for any reason be produced at the trial . . . ." In City of Columbus v.
Edmister,20 the trial court, over defendant's objection that to do so
violated his constitutional rights, permitted the official court reporter
to read the testimony of a witness given at a former trial (at which
the jury had been unable to agree), upon testimony that the witness
had enlisted in the Women's Air Force and was stationed in Texas.
The Court of Appeals for Franklin County upheld the use of the
former testimony, distinguishing Mitchell v. State.2' In the latter
case, the witness was out of the court's jurisdiction for a short vaca-
tion, and a short postponement would have, in all probability, enabled
the state to produce him. 2
FAILURE TO SWEAR JURY BEFORE VOIR DIRE
Ohio Revised Code section 2313.42, which became effective Sep-
tember 9, 1957, requires that:
Any person called as a juror for the trial of any cause shall be
examined under oath or upon affirmation as to his qualifications.
Undoubtedly, many trial lawyers were slow in appreciating this
change in the law. In In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway
Purposes,28 the trial had commenced a week after the effective date
East Cleveland v. Farrell, 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E.2d 630 (1958), in which the court per-
mitted judicial notice to be taken of the accuracy in general of the measurement of speed of
moving objects by radar devices. See DeWitt, Evidence, Survey of Ohio Law - 1958, 10
WEST. REs. L. REv. 405 (1959).
19. Parton v. Weilnau, 169 Ohio St. 145, 151, 158 N.E.2d 719, 724 (1959). Many traffic
court judges are in fact taking judicial notice of the significance of blood alchohol tests in cases
tried to them as finders of the facts. In the light of the supreme court's statement, should
they? A close reading of the opinion indicates that the statement may be dictum, since the
court found it ". . . difficult on the facts of this case to conceive of any reasonable basis for a
finding of any proximate causal relationship between . . . plaintiffs injuries" and defendant's
decedent's intoxication, even if intoxication were proved. Id. at 151, 158 N.E.2d at 725.
20. 106 Ohio App. 443, 155 N.E.2d 72 (1958).
21. 40 Ohio App. 367, 178 N.E. 325 (1931).
22. For a more complete discussion of the use of recorded testimony, see Note, 11 WEsT.
REs. L. REv. 471 (1960).
23. 162 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
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